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counted as coming from enemy sources. I have been keenly in sympathy with
the great EngHsh Liberals in their struggle against modern imperialism in
England, and Leonard Courtney, Gilbert Chesterton, Bernard Shaw, Philip
Snowden, Frank Harris, Francis Neilson, and a host of others who have
stood against the imperial policies of their country are my heroes, along with
the great English Liberals of the past age, Matthew Arnold, Carlyle, Morris,
Hunt, Keats, Shelley, Byron, and Browning, whose patriotism led them to tell
their country her sins in the hope to save her from wrong-doing. This seems
to me true patriotism and the correct interpretation of "my country wrong
or right." The thing which would cheer on our country when she is wrong
is unworthy of the name of patriotism and will lead her to destruction, so my
prayer is and will continue to be, God speed the right and chastise us into the
path of right-doing.
When I say that the facts of this war seem to me to incriminate England,
it is not because I have a German bias. I have not had access to the German
side of the story, except recently in pamphlets and periodicals, which I try to
read with discrimination, keeping in mind the principle that bias and deliberate
attempts at deception in enemy literature are pitfalls that must be avoided.
Of course I have admired greatly the literature, science, public economy, and
general administration, in which Germany has led the world.
As I have said, my information is almost all from English and American
sources. If I know more of Rhodes and his policies than others do who have
read much since the war began, it must be credited to the vivid interest that
I brought to the reading of the Contemporary Review and the Fortnightly
Reviezv in the nineties, and to the accretions that followed, largely at the time
of the Boer War and after the Boer War, when we, who were ardent sym-
pathizers with the republics against the British Empire, entertained some of
the most notable men who came to this country, men who knew the South
African situation at first hand.
* * *
"Alliance, if you please, understanding
between gentlemen."
CECIL RHODES in 1895 made his first attempt to annex the
South African republics to the British empire, and this was a
prelude to uniting Africa later from the Cape to Cairo by annexing
the German colonies through which his railroad was planned to pass.
It was at this time that, "thinking in continents," he formulated
his world-policy to "paint the map of the world a British red."
After the annexation of the African republics, the next great step
in the process was to be a division of the world before 1920 between
the Russians and the united Anglo-Saxon peoples, and the means
that were to be employed were alliances of Great Britain with
Russia and with the United States. The proposition was stated
boldly and fully, and in such a manner as to make the inference
perfectly clear that before 1920 Germany must be removed from
the map, her fragments appropriated by the Allies. As this policy
was presented in the article "1920," published in the Contemporary
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Reviezv (London, December, 1894) no pretext was made that Ger-
many was threatening the world and no chivalrous or holy motives
were assigned for forming this concerted action against her. The
"changed purposes of Pan-Germanism," and "protection of little
nations," and "war against mihtarism," and "war against war" were
all advanced later in the procedure—was not the purpose to appeal
to the public and confuse the issue, to win our American diplomats
and our American people as well as the people of allied Europe?
Mr. Rhodes himself never professed fear of Germany and thought
that the British navy would be sufficient, if increased according to
his recommendation, to capture the new German navy whenever
it chose.
Those who try to understand this world war of Rhodes's mak-
ing and our part in it can do so only if they look to the motives
assigned long before the fray was begun, and before our diplomats
were captured. Therefore I propose to direct attention back to
the beginnings when motives of imperial methods were not masked,
and to the men who first worked for an American alliance. My
discussion will be limited mostly to events on this side of the At-
lantic to show the extent to which the project of an alliance with
"America" has succeeded. Most of the evidence will be unearthed
by future historians who can gain access to facts now hidden, and
a great deal will never be brought to light, for the agreements have
been secret, "understandings between gentlemen," as Mr. Chamber-
lain stated in his announcement to the House of Commons in the
course of the Boer War. An investigation of the expenditure of
Cecil Rhodes's millions, bequeathed to be administered secretly with
the purpose of bringing "America" into alliance with Great Britain
would bring to light much that is hidden, but will hardly be per-
mitted by the empire that after the Jameson Raid failed to investi-
gate Rhodes's piracy in its behalf. On this side of the Atlantic,
however, the course of events is sufficient to prove that a secret
alliance was made— the proof was practically sufficient before Mr.
Chamberlain made his announcement. Perhaps no treaty entered
upon as our constitution provides, hy and with the consent of the
Senate, has ever been so important in its influence upon our na-
tional ideals and welfare as this secret one has been, so it behooves
us before the next step is taken to understand as completely as
possible what has happened, what is involved, and what is likely to
follow.
It might seem that it would be impossible to win the United
States to the Rhodes policy of annexing the republics and painting
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the map of the world red, inckiding our own territory. Washington
had warned us in solemn accents not to entangle ourselves in for-
eign politics, and had promised us the greatest material prosperity
if we would treat all nations justly and as friends,—"I conjure
you to believe me, my fellow countrymen." Webster had urged us
merely to live up to our republican principles as a means of in-
fluencing the world to a more fortunate future in which the nations
would improve their conditions by adopting our most successful
institutions ; and our country has been so marvelously successful that
it has more than realized the hopes that the fathers cherished.
Washington and Webster might well have been astounded to see
the United States of 1895, its population, its power, its wealth, its
expansion, and the influence that its ideals had exerted upon the
world as manifested in legislation and in revolutions in other states,
with the aim to secure such liberties and independence as had bene-
fitted us.
How many changes in British colonial government might be
credited to American success? How much had our influence to do
with the formation of the republics in Central and South America,
and with successful and unsuccessful revolutions in Europe, Africa
and Asia in the course of the last century? "Where the bayonet
is at their throats, men pray for it," said Webster, and this is still
proved true in the revolution attempted in South Africa in 1915
and in the Irish revolution of this current year. Our "Glorious
Fourth," Independence Day, had taken rank with Christmas in the
hearts of our people, and it had been our unvarying practice for
over one hundred years to extend our sympathy to people in any
part of the earth engaged in a struggle for liberty. With such tra-
ditions would it not seem impossible to win our American people
to imperialism as a home policy and support of Rhodes imperialism
as a foreign policy? It Jias proved impossible to win the nation at
large and in the open, but easy to get an efifective secret alliance.
Why? It is time that we should consider this, for the danger is
within our gates.
The first incident in which an American of great influence allied
himiself to help carry out the Rhodes policy was the Jameson Raid
(Dec. 27, 1895^Jan. 1, 1896), intended to result in annexing the
South African republics to the British empire. In the courts of
Pretoria and in the trial of Dr. Jameson before the parliamentary
committee in London, it was proved that John Hays Hammond,
along with other "reformers" had been guilty of intent to bring on
war by gross misrepresentation of facts. The conspirators at-
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tempted to make their raid seem cliivalrous, even holy, by a tele-
gram appealing for assistance in behalf of women and children
who had really never been in danger—a telegram concocted two
months before it was sent out, to be despatched guilefully at the
psychological moment. Not only the "reformers" and Jameson
and Rhodes were guilty of this conspiracy, but also the highest
British officials, including Joseph Chamberlain, secretary for the
colonies ; Lord Salisbury, prime minister ; and the Prince of Wales,
later King Edward VII, for these stood by Mr. Rhodes throughout
the trial and continued to give him their support afterwards. The
parliamentary committee that conducted the trial shielded the main
plotters and entered into the plot, for they refrained from asking
the questions that would have shown the guilt of the imperial offi-
cials ; Parliament also became implicated by accepting the report of
this committee without further question. If I remember correctly,
only two members of the committee dissented and only a few editors
took exception. From that day the policy of the British government
has never varied from the policy that Rhodes outlined—alliances
have been made as he advised, and more than he advised, and the
navy has been increased as he suggested. If the present war ends
as he planned, Germany will have been eliminated before 1920 as
a world power. The pleas of righteous and chivalrous purpose
made by the imperial officials of to-day must be discounted in his-
tory as heavily as those of the chartered company whose offenses
the empire condoned and sheltered—for, as pointed out by a few
English Liberals even to-day, the acts have been paralleled with the
sending of the Johannesburg telegram, only more wily and success-
ful—see the succession of documents and speeches in Hozv Diplo-
mats Make War, by Neilson, member of Parliament throughout
the five crucial years, 1910-1915. Of course that is not the subject
of this paper but another story.
The Boer War and the alliance of England, Russia and Amer-
ica against Germany were planned by Rhodes, as I have said, before
the Jameson Raid, in 1895. If President Cleveland was approached
with a suggestion to form such an alliance he did not respond, for
in accordance with American traditions he expressed the sym-
pathy of our government to the Transvaal after the Jameson Raid,
he upheld the Monroe Doctrine against the encroachments of Eng-
land in Venezuela, and he requested the recall of a British diplomat
who was using his influence in favor of certain candidates in an
American election. Entering upon their duties the year following
the Jameson Raid, President McKinley and John Hay made the
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secret alliance, adopting an imperialist national policy and the secret
Rhodes imperialist world-policy. These have since been maintained
by our succeeding presidents but have never been openly approved
by the nation, for every administration still sees an attempt to fix
the date for the independence of the Philippines, and every effort
to enter into open alliance with England and come to her open
assistance in war has been thus far frustrated.
As a tooth of a mastodon shows an anatomist what the rest
of its skeleton and its life habits must have been, so a very few
facts will be sufficient to show what manner of men Hay and
McKinley were : both had marked traits.
Hay characterized McKinley as a man who wore a mask and
had the face of a "fifteenth-century ecclesiastic," a description that
could hardly be bettered. All the world knows what that type
connoted—wile and guile ; and these traits are amply illustrated in
admiring remarks that Hay adds on the way McKinley could talk
even to an office-seeker so as to let the man go away satisfied,
supposing that he had received a pledge, only to discover his mis-
take later: "Six different senators might in turn press the claims
of their proteges, and Mr. McKinley without duplicity would send
each senator away believing that his own would be appointed ; and
all the while the President had settled on another candidate." This
speaks volumes for McKinley's "diplomacy" ; and what definition
could Mr. Hay have constructed for "duplicity" that he did not
include this under it? What will he not do by omission and com-
mission, and still hold himself guiltless? With such an estimate
of McKinley and such an idea of duplicity, Hay worked for McKin-
ley's election, thereby again giving his own exact measure in public
morality. Thayer says of McKinley's methods : "He had the art
of throwing a moral gloss over policies which were dubious, if not
actually immoral," and instances the extermination of certain tribes
of Filipinos, which extermination McKinley termed "benevolent
assimilation" to make it look well to the public. This is the Rhodes
method to perfection, and provides a formula that will give the cor-
rect interpretation to many events : "throzuing a moral gloss over
policies zvhich were dubious if not actually immoral" !
Men of "big business," like Hanna and Carnegie, were McKin-
ley's friends and supporters, and it is quite possible that Carnegie's
support in the election was secured by a pledge to work for a
British-American union as well as to maintain the high tariff on
steel rails, for as early as 1893 Carnegie had written in the North
American Review, "Let men say what they will, I say that as surely
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as that the sun in the heavens once shone upon Britain and America
united, so surely is it one morning to rise, shine upon, and greet
again the reunited state—the British-American union." It is to be
noted here that Carnegie was distinctly of those who did not put
"America first"—what abuse would not our Anglophiles have ut-
tered if some German-born American had written with like enthu-
siasm proposing even alliance with Germany
!
Of Hay we are told in Roosevelt's Autobiography that since
the days when he served as secretary to our great radical, Abraham
Lincoln, he had grown more and more conservative, and that he
considered Roosevelt too liberal, but that he and Roosevelt were in
complete accord on foreign policies. Thayer says that Hay came
to resent the interference of senators while he was conducting the
state department and would greatly have preferred to carry on his
work without explaining foreign affairs to them and winning their
support. "Trust the President," a slogan he might have made to
fit his own case, has become in this war the slogan of the men who
have been initiated into secret imperial diplomacy, who do not
refrain from questioning him on foreign understandings because
they know that he is going to be unduly friendly with England and
distinctly hostile to Germany. If he should be unduly friendly
with Germany and distinctly hostile to England they would not
trust him or ask the nation to do so.
By a man's chosen friends one knows him, and Hay's friends
were not of democratic type. One of the letters he wrote while in
England mentions with admiration a very rich senator, his friend,
who had been entertaining him at an English countryseat where he
was spending the summer, and calls him "the finest type of Tory
baronet you ever saw"—a truly American spirit would have had at
least a grain of regret at the sight. Hay developed a frigid manner
and was difficult of approach, even forbidding to the public, and
his most intimate friend, Henry Adams, the historian, had like
serious limitations. Thayer describes Adams as a man who had
lost his faiths and enthusiasms, who had withdrawn from the world
as a solitary and now admitted only the select to his presence, and
who saw life as a jest and nothing more. The friends were evidently
sophisticated in the full derivative sense of the word, men who
professed wisdom, but who had lost the true wisdom of life. Adams
had adopted a habitual tone of sardonic irony, and Hay, to judge
from his letters reported by Thayer, was given to perpetual banter,
sarcasm, and jesting, a style quite the opposite of sincere and noble,
and all the more to his discredit because in his impressionable youth
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he had Hved in the daily presence of so great, sincere, simple, and
kindly a man as Abraham Lincoln. That noble presence and Hay's
contact with the pioneers of the West in his early youth should
have taught him the relative values of diamonds-in-the-rough and
sparkling paste, but he did not learn the lesson. He became ex-
clusive, and the basis of his exclusion was not sincerity and nobility.
He seems not to have been sensitive on these points, as is seen in
his relation to McKinley and his evident pleasure in the company
of insincere politicians whom he fell in with in London and to
whom he lent his support.
If Mr. Hay had found a statesman of the type of Gladstone
at the head of the Liberal party when he visited London in 1896,
he might have been elevated to higher ideals, he certainly would
not have been tempted as he now was by Chamberlain and other
men of the Rhodes school. It is startling to see how like McKinley,
Hay, and Adams in guile, insincerity, and lack of faith, were the
English Liberal statesmen at the head of their party in 1897, as de-
scribed in two keenly analytical articles in the Contemporary Reviezv
(London) of that year, signed "A New Liberal," and entitled
"Wanted, a Policy" and "Wanted, a Leader," In the hierarchy the
Tory leaders. Chamberlain and Rhodes, outranked these as mas-
ters of masters. In those articles are set forth the "helpless-
ness and headlessness" of the Liberal party of 1897. Many reforms
awaited a champion, but no champion presented himself to lead the
Liberals to victory in their behalf. Of the Liberals on the Front
Bench
:
1. Lord Roseberry has proved a disappointment. "When a
man fails like that he does not return" ;
2. Harcourt cannot get a following. "It is painfully clear that
public opinion credits him with no belief and less enthusiasm. . .he
fails to impress people with his sincerity. . .People don't beheve in
him, or they don't trust him either. . .That sounds brutal, but there
it is, and there is no use in keeping up the farce of pretending not
to see it"
;
3. John Morley is a most estimable man, but he incurs the sus-
picion of being an impractical doctrinaire
—
"a man of scrupulous
ratiocination, and fastidious words, rather than a man of action.
Of his kind he is admirable, but an impossible leader"
;
4. Asquith is not promising, though even in his college days he
was picked out as Mr. Gladstone's successor and noted by Mr.
Gladstone himself. "He failed to develop the right qualities...
Possibly the strong wine of social success changed him. . . The party
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gets no help from him and certainly no sort of inspiration. Prob-
ably the reason is that he has none to give. For his fatal fault, if
I understand him, is that he believes in nothing"
;
5. Campbell-Bannerman also is not promising. "I have given
him up. He is too rich and too lazy, and his only ambition seems
to have been the hope of the speakership and a peerage."
The "New Liberal" of 1897 wrote with the eye of a seer, and
his judgment has been justified in every case by events. In 1916
the world knows the sequel
:
1. Lord Roseberry never returned;
2. Mr. Harcourt never got a following
;
3. Henry Campbell Bannerman realized his ambition of the
speakership and a peerage. He was the leader of the Liberal oppo-
sition during the Boer War, perhaps persona grata to the govern-
ment because when the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VII)
shook hands with Rhodes in the face of the Jameson investigating
committee, Campbell-Bannerman, then a member of that committee,
refrained from asking for the telegrams that would have shown
the imperial officials in collusion with Rhodes. His pro-Boer ques-
tions annoyed Mr. Chamberlain in the course of the Boer War, but
did not change the outcome one iota. Perhaps they helped Camp-
bell-Bannerman to realize his peerage, for when Sir Edward Grey
was asked to undertake the foreign office he refused to consider
the invitation unless Campbell-Bannerman should be "banished to
the House of Lords," where questions, if asked, would not annoy
him and would certainly be innocuous.
4. Mr. Asquith has been the premier that, along with Sir Ed-
ward Grey, led affairs to Armageddon. "The strong wine of social
success" may have led him farther and farther from the straight
way, for he married the woman of high social standing who was
widely celebrated a few years ago by William Watson's poem, "The
Woman with a Serpent's Tongue"
:
"Who slights the worthiest in the land.
Sneers at the just, contemns the brave,
And blackens goodness in its grave. .. .
"To think that such as she can mar
Names that among the noblest are
;
That hands like hers can touch the strings
That move ivho knows what men and things?"
Had Watson a premonition of this war when he wrote that last
verse? During this war Mrs. Asquith's influence has been fek to
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be so malign that the newspapers of the empire have been appealed
to, to keep silent on the subject.
3. Finally, the prophet was right on Mr. Morley, for he left
the cabinet in 1914 when this war began, because he would not be
held responsible for the future, having been deceived by Sir Edward
Grey though a minister of the Crown, on the most important facts
preceding the declaration of war. He has been the man of probity
and honor, but not a strong leader.
Hay visited London in 1896, a few months after Jameson's
Raid and at about the time when Mark Twain was visiting the scene
of the raid in South Africa ; and he returned to London as our
ambassador in 1897, immediately after McKinley's inauguration,
at about the time that Mark Twain was writing his marvelously
lucid and penetrating chapters on Rhodes and the raid in Following
the Equator. Because my well-restrained statements concerning
Rhodes might see exaggerated and because sound conclusions could
hardly be stated more picturesquely or with greater force, I shall
quote his words to show the respect that was paid to Rhodes and his
policies in the nineties
:
"In the opinion of many people Cecil Rhodes is South Africa
;
others think he is only a large part of it. . . .He is the only colonial
in the British dominions whose. .. .speeches, undipped, are cabled
to the ends of the earth, and he is the only unroyal outsider whose
arrival in London can compete for attention with an eclipse. . . .The
whole South African world seems to stand in shuddering awe of
him, friend and enemy alike. It was as if he was deputy-God on
the one side and deputy-Satan on the other. . . .blasphemed by none
among the judicious, and even by the indiscreet in guarded whispers
only."
This is how Rhodes's influence was estimated by an unbiassed
American observer, perhaps the keenest mind among us at that
period. It would hardly be possible to overestimate the influence
of Rhodes upon the policy of his country. He was no poor scholar
with a limited influence upon scholars, like Treitschke, no remote
philosopher influencing a still smaller circle of philosophers, like
Nietzsche, but himself the Superman, nourished on the doctrine of
the survival of the fittest formulated a generation earlier by his own
countryman, and interpreting that doctrine in the light of his con-
viction that He and His are the fittest. A good imperialist appre-
ciation of Rhodes is the article by H. Cust, M. P., in the North
American Review, July, 1902. This member of Parliament ex-
presses no horror of Rhodes though his schemes imply the wars to
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follow, a conspiracy to be carried out later by political corrup-
tion, and consummate hypocrisy to cover up the tracks. Cust is
one of that Parliament, doubtless, that rewarded Alfred Austin with
the Laureateship hot-cakes after his writing his poem in praise of
Jameson's chivalrous ( !) raid, and he and his Hke have led their
nation into holy horror of Germany because, they charge, she in-
tended to enter on a career of conquest and annexation—the very
policy they admired in Rhodes! Can they produce documents
to prove their charge stronger than those that convict Rhodes?
Rhodes saw the annexation of the republics before he died, and he
lies buried in a spot that he himself selected on the top of a high
African mountain overlooking the scene of his triumph. When
the people of the conquered republics lift up their eyes to that tomb
they quote the appropriate text that the devil took him up into an
exceeding high mountain and showed him all the kingdoms of the
earth and the glory thereof, and said unto him, "All these things
will I give unto thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me"—but
Rhodes, being an imperial Englishman, did not say, "Get thee be-
hind me, Satan." Our friends in South Africa tell a good story that
illustrates the feeling concerning his plans to annex the world—that
while Mr. Rhodes was a guest at their home they were out on the
porch one night when the talk turned to the stars and whether they
are inhabited. Mr. Rhodes was the person who hoped they were
not, and the rest judged that that was because the stars were beyond
his reach: he could not hope to annex them to the British empire.
Mark Twain sums up Rhodes's schemes to annex everything beneath
the stars, in chapters that should be read by every American and
made our text-book to ensure our understanding the policy and the
methods that took Hay and his successors in. What could be more
illuminating testimony than this
:
"What is the secret of his formidable supremacy? One says
it is his prodigious wealth—a wealth whose drippings in salaries
and other ways makes men his interested and loyal vassals ; another
says it is his personal magnetism and his persuasive tongue, and
that these hypnotize and make happy slaves of all that drift within
the circle of his influence; another says it is his majestic ideas, his
vast schemes for the territorial aggrandizement of England ; and
another says that he wants the earth and wants it for his own, and
the belief that he will get it and let his friends on the ground floor is
the secret. . . . He deceived the Duke of Fife—it is the Duke's own
word—but that does not destroy the Duke's loyalty to him. He
tricks the reformers into immense trouble with his raid, but most
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of them believe he meant well. He weeps over the harshly taxed
Johannesburgers and makes them his friends : at the same time he
taxes his charter-settlers fifty percent. . . . He raids and robs and
slays and enslaves the Matabele, and gets worlds of Charter Chris-
tian applalise for it. He has beguiled England into buying Charter
waste paper for Bank of England notes, ton for ton, and the rav-
ished still burn incense to him as the Eventual God of Plenty. . . .
An archangel with wings to one-half of the world, Satan with a
tail to the other half. I admire him, I frankly confess it, and when
his time comes I shall buy a piece of the rope for a keepsake."
What insight into the weaknesses and wrongs of the modern
world ! Oh, that Mark Twain had been our ambassador to London
instead of Hay ! He would have understood the methods by which
the imperial officials that supported Rhodes were working, and
would have seen through the toils that were weaving to ensnare our
republic. Perhaps Hay saw more than he commented on, knew more
than he told, and made terms with it as he had with McKinley's
indirection.
Two incidents revealed in his letters seem to show that Hay
was simply flattered and dazzled and did not know that he was
taken in. The first was that in which he met both Mr. Chamber-
lain and Harcourt at a dinner in London, in 1896, and had some
talk with them, feeling like the maiden in highly distinguished
company: "It was a chance that a girl of her age rarely gets to see
the greatest politicians of the time in their hours of ease" ; second
was that of a day or two later, when Balfour and Harcourt invited
him to talk over Cleveland's Venezuelan message and the prospect
of McKinley's election. He was then struck by the fact that nearly
every word he had said to Balfour had been repeated to Harcourt
and that Harcourt had remembered it all : "These English public
men have wonderful memories," he muses. He was then asked to
talk with Mr. Chamberlain and Curzon, also. The conversations
are said to have been long, and probably touched on other subjects
besides those for which he was invited, for Thayer tells that when
Hay was in London in 1896 "he got ztnnd of the changed purposes
of German imperialism. . .In brief, his experiences in London re-
vealed to him the aims of Pan-Germanism."
In the opinion of Dr. Lusher, Pan-Germanism was merely an
expression of the national consciousness and an efifort at self-
preservation paralleled in other nations : "If Germany is wrong,
others too have been wrong; indeed, if her conduct is unjustifiable,
no country in the world can establish its moral and ethical right
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to existence." Certainly as compared with England Germany had
been slow in setting out to annex colonies, and she is hardly to be
blamed for looking toward the Philippines and tracts in China and
Africa if England is approved for annexing Egypt and millions of
fertile miles in other regions. The questions for historians to settle
are. whether in 1896 Germany had changed her legitimate purposes
so as to threaten the civilized world or any particular nation in it,
and exactly what the "changed purposes" were, as presented then
to Mr. Hay in London by British government officials. I have seen
no proof that she had changed her purposes, but, as I have shown,
on the contrary, that Mr. Rhodes had schemed before 1877 to paint
nearly all of the available earth red, and, backed by the imperial
officials, had outlined a scheme in 1895 for dividing the world be-
tween the Russian and Anglo-Saxon peoples allied—which could
only be done by breaking Germany. From 1895, if not earlier,
Germany must prepare for "the Day," and her preparations to
defend herself must give an opportunity to her foes zvho had made
the conspiracy against her to ascribe her efforts to overwhelming
ambition, and in general to misinterpret her every act of prudence
to the world. It should be the first doctrine of history that assertion
from an enemy source does not constitute proof, but it seems not
to have occurred to Hay or to Thayer that mere statement from
London was not enough to prove fellonious intent on the part of
Germany and that the informers were not above suspicion of both
national interest and duplicity. Chamberlain having just been impli-
cated with Rhodes in Jameson's piratical raid in South Africa (as
all the world believed the more because the investigating committee
had not fully investigated) and Harcourt being considered insincere
by even his own party, as "A New Liberal" testified.
Hay seems to have felt something of this, as his choice of the
word "politician" shows. Did he know that Rhodes and his followers
were themselves "thinking in continents" since 1877, with the purpose
of "painting the map of the world red," and that the first step in the
process after the unification of Africa was to be a division of the
world (especially Germany) between the allies (Russia and the
United Anglo-Saxon peoples) ? He may have known all of this
and thought it no worse than McKinley's duplicity, which he counts
not against him, for these are the ways of the world that is after
all very merry, and very bright with tinsel ! As for Republic vs.
Empire, that meant little to him
—
possibly he had come to like the
ways of empire best. He may therefore have seen deeply into the
Rhodes policies and have wished to bring the changes that they
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implied—in short, he may have simply judged their evil as good in
promise and to be winked at. He certainly showed penetration
sometimes, for of the French-Russian alliance, which had just been
announced in London in 1896, he remarked that France had sold
herself like a prostitute and would not even receive a high price, a
judgment that is being justified in this war, where poor France has
lost far more than she can hope to gain, but Russia and England
may hope to win, as Rhodes computed.
It is not to our purpose to go deeply into the motives that led
McKinley and Hay and their circle to desire an alliance with Eng-
land, secret if it must be, open if possible. Perhaps the "big busi-
ness" of such men as Carnegie and Lodge predisposed them toward
an imperialism of the type that supported Rhodes rather than
toward a republicanism that hampered "big business" by anti-trust
legislation. Not only Carnegie in 1893, but Sir George Grey in the
same year, and Rhodes in 1895 had written articles expressing them-
selves for the incorporation of the United States in the British
empire—Rhodes had held these ideas much earlier. Is it possible
that Hay did not know this? As soon as he, then our ambassador
to England, brought the question of alliance up in 1898, consulting
influential friends by letter, Senator Lodge approved it heartily,
perhaps then as now interested personally as well as in behalf of
his state in the "big business" of making munitions. Alliance, of
course, means wars to follow.
Hay to Lodge: "Your letter gave me the most gratifying ac-
count of feeling among the leading men of America that I have had
from any source. It is a moment of immense importance, not only
for the present but for all the future." "The leading men of Amer-
ica" who had expressed approval doubtless included Roosevelt and
others of the Harvard group.
Was the motive of these men standing for alliance high and
idealistic, defensible and appealing? If it had been they would
have worked openl)^ not in secret. (1) Was it warmth of feeling
for the mother country? Possibly it was to some extent, as in
Carnegie's case, but then it is the hyphenated Americanism that
men of this group have been rightly quick and loud in condemning.
It now appears that this class of English-Americans have been our
only alarming "hyphenates" for the past twenty years, and it is
consistent with the Rhodes methods that they, who are themselves
pro-English and working for an English alliance, have cast reproach
on our German-Americans for warm regards to the sufferings of
their mother-country, though not one of our German-Americans
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has proposed to form a German-American alliance, or to involve
the United States in war for Germany's sake. To continue the
question of motive: (2) Was it because England had given to
America the most precious of her national institutions ? That ques-
tion is open to debate, and other nations would have much to say.
If one is to look to sources, the Dutch might maintain that little
Holland gave what is best in her own institutions to England, as
well as that she gave the most precious gifts to the United States,
not only to New York, but even to New England— even to Har-
vard. (3) Was it because the men of "big business" in the two
nations acting together could put money in their pockets? There is
good evidence that it was. What ignoble and mercenary motives
must our American poet, William Vaughn Moody, have been hear-
ing when he stood on Boston Common beside the Shaw Memorial
and, facing the monuments of a past of splendid ideals, was moved
to write in his "Ode in Time of Hesitation,"
"When we turn and question in suspense
If these things be indeed after these ways,
And what things are to follow after these,
Our fluent men of place and consequence
Fumble and fill their mouths with hollow phrase,
Or for the end-all of deep argument
Intone their dull commercial liturgies
—
I dare not yet believe ! My ears are shut
!
I will not hear their thin satiric praise. . .
.
We shall discern the right
And do it tardily—O ye who lead.
Take heed
!
Blindness we may forgive, but baseness we will smite."
Men of Massachusetts, and Boston, and Harvard have been
foremost in defending and assisting the British Rhodes-imperialists
in this war, and in assigning low motives to those who stand against
them. Let them reexamine the evidence and see if they be not them-
selves again on the wrong side. In England the most open minds
are realizing, even to-day,' the wiles of their secret foreign office
and admitting its methods of bringing on this war. It is well that
we should not forget that the same interested classes in Massachu-
setts once found good arguments for slavery and the slave trade,
and that a generation ago their "gentlemen mobs" stoned Whittier
and tried to hang Garrison to a lamp-post. Let them examine the
life of Rhodes and the imperial "gang" who captured our diplo-
mats twenty years ago by inventing "Pan-Germanism" just at the
2 Neilson, How Diplomats Make War.
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time when they themselves had determined to paint the map of the
world British red by this attack of allies upon Germany, let them
examine the means by which our information during this war, and
before it, has been diverted and perverted to further the purposes
of the empire ; let them try to investigate the use that has been made
of Rhodes's millions, bequeathed to be expended by a secret com-
mittee, to win America to an alliance with England. Does not all
this secrecy prove that this cause cannot stand the light?
"Massachusetts, God forgive her.
She's a-kneelin' with the rest."
Most of our people to-day, and also a great body of English
people, are not to be blamed for not understanding the situation
in Europe and our relation to it, for they have been deliberately
misled by masters of guile, as the following incidents will show.
Some of our leaders have been fully aware of the ignoble and un-
American policies that are being secretly carried out and they should
be held to account. One likes to think that even those who yielded
to the lower motives had been appealed to also by higher sentiments
and traditions. Let them defend themselves,
"Blindness zve may forgive, but baseness zue zvill smite."
I believe that the great body of our English-American people
in New England, as throughout the country, is truly American at
heart, as is proved by the fact that the race-sympathy of our Eng-
lish-Americans was strongly against Rhodes and his imperialism
and zvith the radical English party, the pro-Boers, in the Boer War.
By selection and descent they are of the very best that England
has produced, and superior to the larger number of the English
to-day in England, being the idealistic, radical element that England
cast out as effectually as France cast out her Huguenots, and as the
most independent element has been cast out from Ireland—all to
our good fortune. It is only our imperialists of "big business" and
"frenzied finance," in sympathy with the English Tory element,
that are trying now to carry out the Rhodes war-program, though
professing to be innocent of intent, chivalrous to small nations,
even holy because fighting for humanity
—
and against zvarl A
"moral gloss" indeed ; as strong as the Johannesburg fake-telegram
that pleaded in the names of the women and children
!
In reading Hay's life one sometimes wonders whether stupidity
or consummate deceit is the solution of the problems. In a letter
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to Senator Lodge in 1898 he tells how he persuaded Mr. Chamber-
lain to give warm words of support to the project of an alliance
between England and America, and how warmly Chamberlain gave
them. Mr. Chamberlain must have been a good actor if he kept
his face straight when he heard it, for he had been scheming for
some time past how to get America to enter into an alliance, against
her ideals, traditions and interests. With Rhodes, Chamberlain
doubtless held the opinion that unless Great Britain could make the
American alliance and the Russian alliance, and carry out her poli-
cies against Germany before 1920, she would sink to a third-rate
power^ while the United States would take first rank. They might
well have thought that it would be difficult to persuade the United
States to abet, and to follow ! The following is the quotation from
Hay's letter to Lodge just referred to:
"Among the political leaders on both sides I find not only sym-
pathy, but a somewhat eager desire that the other fellow shall not
be the more friendly. Chamberlain's startling speech was due partly
to a conversation I had with him in which I hoped that he would
not let the Opposition have a monopoly of goodwill to America.
He is greatly pleased at the reception his speech met with on our
side, and says that he 'don't care a hang what they say about it on
the continent.' " Of course, "the continent" is Germany, always
the "enemy" in mind in the nineties. Chamberlain's "startling
speech," after warm references to "kinsmen across the Atlantic"
(he chose to forget how many of the people in the United States are
not from England and "kinsmen") contained these words: "I can
go so far as to say, that terrible as war may be, even war itself
would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars
and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together in an Anglo-
Saxon alliance." There is no suggestion on either side that loss
to the United States may be involved. Oh, that Mark Twain had
been our ambassador in London ! John Hay is distinctly of that
half of the world that would look up to Rhodes as "an archangel
with wings"—Mark Twain belongs to the other. Is it conceivable
that if he had been our ambassador in London Mark Twain would
have been persuading Chamberlain and Rhodes to take him into the
lair of the Lion, and be zvarm about it? not knowing that they were
scheming how to persuade him to enter? And Hay is thought to be
a statesman ! And he proceeds to violate his country's republican
ideals, to tie it up in expense and danger in the Philippines, to lend
its aid to the British to crush the South African republics, thereby
giving Republican government a great setback in the history of the
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world and strengthening empire, and to work in alliance with Eng-
land for the destruction of Germany ! Let future historians decide
whether he was a trustful incompetent biassed by cater-cousinship,
merely taking fair words at their face value and knowing nothing
of further imperial purposes, or whether he was a profound schemer
who knew the real motives and further policies but chose not to
admit the real situation, while he pledged his support to an alliance
meaning wars and the absorption of our republic in an empire.
In the following years, while the splendid English Liberals (called
in derision pro-Boers, although they were only pro-justice, and in
the best sense pro-British) tried with all their might to keep Mr.
Chamberlain from the war that the Rhodes policy ran in Africa,
Hay and McKinley abetted the imperialists to the best of their
ability. Hay sometimes had a sense that he had fallen from the
old high ideals—witness his letter to John Bigelow, our veteran
diplomatist, who had written him in the traditional American spirit
concerning the Philippines
:
Hay to John Bigelow, London, Sept. 5, 1898: "I fear that you
are right about the Philippines, and I hope that the Lord will be
good to us poor devils who have to take care of them. I marvel at
your suggesting that we pay for them. I should have expected no
less of your probity, but how many except those educated by you
in the school of morals and diplomacy would agree with you?
Where did I pass you on the road of life? You used to be my
senior; now you are ages younger than I am.... and yet I am
going to be Secretary of State for a little while !"
After such clear admission of an understanding of what he
had become, the things that Hay did as Secretary of State in the
Boer War seem not less than the conscious sin against the Holy
Ghost, the unpardonable. Thayer says : "John Hay was among the
few who understood the significance of the change from the very
first moment, and he accepted it without looking back, or, so far as
appears, without regrets .... He shaped all his work as Secretary
of State with reference to it. To place this country as speedily as
possible in such relations zvith the rest of the tvorld as became its
character, was henceforth his controlling purpose." This last state-
ment means that he made his arrangements with Mr. Chamberlain
and Lord Salisbury to help in crushing the Boer republics, and even
in devising measures to be used against Germany in the war that
they, with Rhodes, projected before 1920. Proof of this and of his
active hostility to Germany will be quoted in incidents presently.
President McKinley and Hay intended to propose an alliance
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with England to Congress, but the mere mention of this purpose
called forth such a storm of remonstrance from the country that
they gave it up. In a few days hundreds of thousands of names
were sent in through Irish-American societies, a convincing demon-
stration. The many public meetings held throughout this nation
to pass resolutions, collect money for the Boer republics, and send sup-
plies for the Boer prisoners of war in the Bermudas spoke the same
strong sentiment. In Chicago an ambulance corps was fitted out
;
in Denver and Boston the city councils adopted resolutions of sym-
pathy
;
public meetings were held in every part of the nation for
protest ; Edward Everett Hale led in relief work ; but for the first
time in its history the national government refrained from passing
resolutions of sympathy because the president, who strongly dom-
inated his party, opposed it. In every way he showed his willingness
to let the republics go down, so reversing the policy of President
Grant toward them when the British attacked them at Amajuba,
and of President Cleveland when Dr. Jameson made his raid. He
even permitted unusual violations of American rights, the most
notable of which were rifling of mails under our flag in Africa, and
treating foodstuffs as contraband of war. This argues that McKin-
ley and Hay had discussed with officials in London even the policy
they would follow in the projected European war to occur before
ip20, the war against Germany, and is significant especially in con-
nection with articles in the English press of the nineties on cutting
off food supplies in case of war with Germany. An American ship
filled with grain and billed for Africa was captured while crossing
the Atlantic by a boat of the British navy. Some editorials made
comments at the time that this was probably not a bona fide trans-
action, for the republics would hardly buy grain in the United
States, but that it was perhaps intended as a precedent, to be quoted
when food supplies were seized in the next war. The incident is
worthy of the "Rhodes gang," and of wily and guileful fifteenth-
century diplomacy on this side.
A short time before the South African war broke out President
McKinley called Hay home from London and appointed him Secre-
tary of State. At the close of the Boer war I happened to hear of
the extreme dissatisfaction among the friends of John Sherman
at McKinley 's policy. Sherman had been Secretary of State during
the time when Hay had been ambassador in London, but had not
been consulted on all of these matters of the Spanish and African
wars and would not have consented to the new policy, which was
agreed on secretly while he was officially at the head of the depart-
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ment. Hay and Chamberlain doubtless made their alliance or came
to their "understanding" before the Spanish war, which McKinley
professed to be trying to keep out of, and which he need not have
fought, for there was no proof that the "Maine" was blown up by
Spaniards, and Spain had just offered to come to an agreement
on points under dispute.
Certain editorials written before the Spanish war in some of
the "inspired" papers pointed out that the war, if it came, and
especially the Philippines, if they were taken, would draw us out
into world politics, and this has always seemed to me the probable
reason why we went to war and acquired the islands. Spain had
been impoverished by them, their people were Asiatic and not likely
to become able to manage themselves as a republic even after our
efforts to teach them, and strategically they are hard to defend. A
genius at stategy, Napoleon, practically gave us Louisiana because it
would be hard to defend, and Russia gave us Alaska for the same
good reason, but McKinley and Hay possibly wanted to take the
Philippines because when the day of our trial comes they wanted
us to be so endangered that England could seem to deserve our
gratitude by offering us assistance—and so the alliance would be
made. This happened in a small way when Dewey entered Manila.
The incident of the German admiral at the battle of Manila, of
which so much has been made, illustrates imperialist efforts to make
the most of trouble between the United States and Germany.
It was not very long since England had taken Egypt, and only
a short time since she had tried to take the Boer republics—why
should Germany, also wishing colonies, not have been thinking of
capturing the Philippines? Our president helped to thwart her by
actually taking them and then made them the occasion of our build-
ing a great navy, to save England and France the necessity of
maintaining a fleet in the Far East. We became, in fact, the offen-
sive arm of the British in the Far East,^ and pulled the chestnuts
out of the fire. The only people among us who can gain by our
holding the islands are the munitions makers and a few bankers
who will exploit mines and franchises ; the nation must pay. While
Spain is recovering from her possessions, having lost them, we who
have acquired them shall continue to be weakened by holding them,
in money, men and ideals, of which the greatest is our confused and
violated ideals.
Sherman was anti-imperialist and "pro-Boer," and he and his
friends fought the McKinley policies at the time of the Boer war,
3 Usher, Pan-Germanism, chapter on "Position of the United States."
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but were unable to change them. They were the more embittered
because Sherman had been forced out of his seat in the Senate to
give it to Mark Hanna as a reward for election services in McKin-
ley's compaign, and because now he had been not only disregarded,
but forced out of his position in the Department of State. Even
Thayer, Hay's apologist, thinks that Sherman had been badly used
—
another instance of fifteenth-century guile, added to ingratitude.
My informant in this matter of anti-imperialist feeling was the
Hon. F. W. Reitz, a man whose testimony on the South African
situation should be taken into account by any who write history.
Mr. Reitz, if any person, knew the whole story. Born in Africa,
he was connected by birth and marriage with the foremost families
of South Africa. His sister was the wife of Premier Schreiner
of Cape Colony, who was the brother of Olive Schreiner the author.
He had completed his education in a European university, and had
distinguished himself in law before he entered public life. Pre-
ceding President Stein, Mr. Reitz had been at the head of the two
republics in their most critical days. He was the president of the
Orange Free State who made the treaty of alliance with the Trans-
vaal, by which the two nations joined their forces if either should
be attacked. After his removal to the Transvaal he was appointed
judge of the Supreme Court, and later Secetary of State, which
position he filled throughout the war, taking charge of the affairs
of the nation after President Kruger removed to Europe. He is a
man of insight and conviction, of calm and kindly nature, serious,
but also gifted with a sense of humor, which, like Philip Freneau in
our Revolutionary war and James Russell Lowell in the Mexican
war, he used to keep up the spirits of his countrymen by a series
of war poems in dialect. Mr. Reitz was an "Irreconcilable" and had
been forbidden by Mr. Chamberlain to return to Pretoria, being
made an exception to the Proclamation of Amnesty.
While considering what he and his family would do next Mr.
Reitz came to this country, and while he was lecturing in Michigan
and Iowa on the Boer war he and his wife were our guests for
three or four weeks just after they had been in Philadelphia and
Washington among our anti-imperialists. At this period, if ever,
he would have given way to bitterness and shown poor judgment,
but throughout this trying time he remained perfectly just, and
deliberately as well as constitutionally moderate in statement. His
disabilities have since been removed and he is now a member of the
senate in the South African parliament. The following incident,
of which the last part was told me by Mr. and Mrs. Reitz, illus-
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trates the length to which McKinley and Hay were willing to go
in their partisanship for England at the time of the Boer war.
Soon after the South African war began our consul in Pretoria
notified the State Department that the British were interfering
with our mails and opening state documents under our flag on trains
in Africa, but nothing was done about it by our president and Mr.
Hay, outside of attempting to discredit the report. When the con-
sul started for America to lay his evidence before those interested,
he and his report were held up to ridicule before he arrived and
he was at once superseded by Adalbert Hay, the son of our Secre-
tary of State.
Adalbert Hay was very young and had had no previous experi-
ence in foreign affairs ; his father was known to be hostile to the
cause of the republics to which he was now accredited—in fact was
understood to have bargained them away by secret diplomacy—but
these were evidently not sufficient reasons against his selection for
the post at this time. When young Mr. Hay started to fill his post
as consul at Pretoria, his father sent him by way of London, where
he visited en route Lord Salisbury, the very man who was con-
ducting the war by which the republics he was accredited to were
being done to death! Has fifteenth-century politics anything to
exceed this in ingenious and studied insult?—an affront given weak
friends suffering defeat, to flatter and reassure a powerful friend
hostile to them, and this affront given by the very person that bar-
gained them away and betrayed them? There is something barbaric
about it—it belongs earlier than the fifteenth century, to the period
of Regan and Oswald!
The sequel is brighter and more creditable to human nature.
When Mr. Adalbert Hay reached Pretoria he was received in a
friendly spirit by President Kruger and Mr. Reitz, the Secretary
of State. He was entertained at the home of Mr. Reitz, and proved
himself then and always kindly and straightforward. When the
Boer government at Pretoria was broken up, he returned to Amer-
ica a true friend to many of the Boers whom he met in Africa, and
leaving many friends behind. In Washington, after he returned,
he was frank in correcting misunderstandings about the Boers and
began collecting money for Boer relief, which led to a difference
between him and his father; but after his death (he fell from a
window in an upper story of his club, where he was sitting to take
the air one very warm night) his father contributed money in his
memory for the relief of the destitute in South Africa. That was
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after the war was over, when the repubHcs had been annexed to the
empire.
Another incident that shows the feeHng of President McKinley
to the British and the Boers is the following, which also, I think,
has never appeared in print. It was told us by Mr. Wolmarans,
one of the committee of three sent over by the republics to lay their
cause before our president. When the hour appointed for the inter-
view came the envoys were attended by a number of people, in-
cluding their secretary and Mr. Montague White, the former repre-
sentative of the Transvaal in London. President McKinley listened
to their address, then took up a typewritten document which had
been prepared before they entered, and read it as his answer. We
are told by Benjamin Franklin that the American Indians had a
custom of making no reply to a delegation from another tribe until
at least a day had elapsed, so that the other tribe might know that its
communication had been duly considered. This was held to be a
point of dignity and good manners, but such dignity and good man-
ners were not observed at the White House that day. When his
"reply" was finished the President asked the delegates whether
they had noticed the beautiful view from the window of the room
in which they were standing, and led them to see it, and while they
were looking at the view that he pointed out, he left the room. No
time was given them for discussion.
One might think that this would cap the climax of the incident,
but not so. In the course of the interview the secretary happened to
stray about the room, and at the open door which led into the next
room found Lord Pauncefote, the British ambassador, sitting within
earshot of the proceedings. It is to be hoped that American
diplomacy never reached a lower ebb.
After President McKinley's death, we who had felt the error
of those days had hopes that President Roosevelt would be the
strong man who would set things right. At once imperialist edi-
torials began chorusing the praises of our Secretary of State and
hoping fervidly that he would be retained, and very soon an an-
nouncement followed that President Roosevelt had invited Hay to
retain his position and would carry out the McKinley policies. He
seems to have carried them out, always and consistently. It is far
from me to wish to detract from the good things that President
Roosevelt did. He proved himself a strong and able man in some
things, but he failed to take the greatest opportunity that Fate gave
into his hands, of being just and friendly to all foreign nations. In
his autobiography his ideal for his foreign policy is high and thor-
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oughly American in character, but he did not reverse the policy
toward the South African repubHcs, with whom we had had special
treaties signed by President Grant ; he refused to read or even
receive the written statement sent him by Korea, when Japan was
annexing that little country, with whom we also had a treaty ; he
himself, with Secretary Hay, violated the little republic of Colom-
bia, breaking the treaty we had with her and not even compen-
sating her generously, and yet he has been violent in reproaching the
United States for not going armed to the aid of Belgium, assigning
the reason that she is a "little nation" that had a treaty with us
—
although she had given various evidences that she intended to fight
on the side of France, and although Germany had proposed to
England to pledge herself not to invade Belgium if England would
do the same, and had offered Belgium to do her no injury if she
would merely permit transit-—far less than the Allies have since
exacted from Greece. It seems that Roosevelt's sympathy is as
1 : 3 at the most, and that in the fourth case it is a Rhodes-imperial
pretext. He cast in his lot with the "Rhodes gang," and when he
became a candidate for the presidency one of the candidates for
the vice-presidency on his ticket was John Hays Hammond, the
mining engineer who had worked with Jameson and Rhodes in
Johannesburg, who was one of the "reformers" that devised the
fake telegram. Roosevelt is discredited in that he would have
accepted Hammond as his running mate, to manage by his Rhodes
tricks the making of our treaties, and in case of our president's
death to become our president, in charge of foreign affairs.
When Mr. Reitz was in the United States he was told by a
person in contact with President Roosevelt that the President would
be pleased to talk the African situation over with him, but he did
not act on the suggestion, for there was nothing to be said except
in reproach, and that would not be worth while.
One letter in Thayer's Life of John Hay is evidence that Hay
and Roosevelt were not in a frame of mind friendly to Germany
and anxious to make the most of incidents that betokened friendli-
ness on the part of officials representing Germany. By Thayer this
incident is quoted only as evidence of Hay's humor and playfulness,
but it is also evidence that he played a dangerous game and mali-
ciously fomented ill-feeling against Germany, and that President
Roosevelt was far from blameless. The incident reported is this
:
the Emperor of Germany had sent President Roosevelt a medal
such as he had presented to the German soldiers who fought
against the Boxer rebels in China, intending it as a delicate recog-
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nition of our soldier-president, and certain that his gift would not
be open to criticism on. the ground of its intrinsic value, for our .
Constitution forbids our presidents to receive such gifts. The gift
was not acknowledged speedily and cordially, and an attache placed
himself in the path of the Secretary of State as a reminder of his
monarch's interest
:
Letter of John Hay to President Roosevelt: "State Depart-
ment, Nov. 12, 1901. Count Quadt has been hovering around the
State Department for three days in ever narrowing circles and at
last swooped upon me this afternoon, saying that the Foreign Office
and even the Palace Unter den Linden was in a state of intense
anxiety to know how you received His Majesty's Chinese medal,
conferred only on the greatest sovereigns. As I had not been
authorized by you to express your emotions I had to sail by dead
reckoning, and considering the vast intrinsic value of the souvenir
•
—I should say at least thirty-five cents— and its wonderful artistic
merit, representing the German eagle eviscerating the Black Dragon,
and its historical accuracy, which gives the world to understand
that Germany is IT, and the rest of the world nowhere, I took the
responsibility of saying to Count Quadt that the President could
not have received the medal with anything but emotions of pleasure
commensurate with the high appreciation he entertains for the Em-
peror's Majesty—and that a formal acknowledgment would be made
in due course. He asked me if he was at liberty to say anything
like this to his government, and I said he was at liberty to say any-
thing whatever the spirit would move him to utter. I give thanks
to whatever powers there be that I was able to allow him to leave
the room without quoting Quantula sapientia."
Mr. Hay must have been an excellent dissembler if the Ger-
man diplomat did not see the tongue in the cheek. Again this is
Oswald diplomacy ; and the man who writes such a letter is piling
up the fuel to start the fire of war. This letter implies perfect
agreement on the part of President Roosevelt and his Secretary
of State.
I do not remember that President Roosevelt made an effort to
secure an alliance with England in his administration, but this was
done by his successor. President Taft, who was named as candidate
by the Republican convention because Roosevelt gave him the
strongest of support, using the argument that Taft was thoroughly
acquainted with the situation and would carry on the "policies"
of the Administration. This he proceeded to do, and in March,
1911, proposed to make a treaty with England providing for un-
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limited arbitration for all time. This, of course was greeted by a
chorus of approval by English speakers and editors.
Strangely enough, Sir Edward Grey's peace speech was de-
livered while he was supporting estimates for greater naval expen-
ditures, consistently with Rhodes's advice. That year England,
Russia and France spent £24,241,226 against Austria and Germany's
£11,710,859; by 1914 the Entente were spending £43,547,555 against
the Triple Allies' £17,605,204, this last including Italy's expenditure;
and long before 1911 the Entente had secret agreements as to
mobilizing and plans of campaign, that only the small inner circle
knew, not including other members of the Cabinet, unless Mr.
Asquith. In the summer of 1911 the Moroccan incident all but pre-
cipitated war. On the authority of William T. Stead we know
that the British envoys went to the conference instructed to bring
on war, and Lord Roberts in a signed article tells that then the
British navy was assembled and ready for action. But that time
Russia did not mobilize and so Germany would not declare war,
though she had been deliberately affronted. When President Taft
proposed unlimited arbitration for all time with England did he
know that this danger of European war was to be created in 1911
by England? And why did he not try to bind us to Germany by
a like treaty at the same time? Also why did he send a squadron
of our navy to visit the nations now Allies, but not to visit Ger-
many? Immediately upon his proposing unlimited arbitration with
England for all time. Sir Edward Grey's speech took it that "this
would probably lead to their following with an agreement to join
each other in any case when one of them had a quarrel with a third
nation that had refused to arbitrate."
And this phrasing, "a third nation that had refused to arbitrate,"
throws light upon (1) the next attempt to bind the nations by
arbitration treaties, and (2) the proposal made by Sir Edward Grey
just before the war in 1914 that Germany subject her cause to arbi-
tration, even while Russia was mobilizing, when every day lost
would place Germany at the mercy of her foes and result in their
fighting the war on her territory when they were fully ready
—
another instance that shows how carefully imperial methods are
thought out. Did Presidient Taft know that these arbitration
treaties that he proposed could be "worked" in this way to enable
the Allies to get the best of Germany?
When President Taft and Sir Edward Grey were first pro-
posing unlimited arbitration, the British editors were mightily
pleased, but American editors were not. The Washington Post ex-
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pressed the national feeling when it said, " 'Peace, commerce, and
honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none,' is
part of the unwritten constitution of the United States." Soon it
became clear, as in McKinley's administration, that an open alliance
would not be acceptable to this nation. Congress was strongly
against it, as well as the press, but no sooner had Congress ad-
journed than President Taft again advanced the project, and again
had to drop it. The Chicago Inter Ocean called it "bubble-blowing
—a splendid jug-handled arrangement for us to be obliged to
quarrel with every European nation for England's sake ! For that
is what it would come to." Finally President Taft, convinced that
unlimited arbitration was impracticable, began holding unofficial
conversations with M. Jusserand, the ambassador from France,
with the result that he finally arranged arbitration treaties with
England and France, but not with Germany, who perhaps saw her
danger. If Germany also had signed she would have been obliged
either to break her treaty of arbitration while Russia was mobili-
zing, or to sufifer the consequences—invasion when Russia and the
other Allies were fully ready to attack her, when no chance was
left her to push the war to their territory.
When one sees these methods, that Rhodes would surely have
applauded, one must question whether there is a chance that the
holy names of "peace" and "arbitration" have not been used among
us these last few years to cloak the policy of war that was proposed
against Germany before 1920. More than a suspicion has grown
upon me, knowing the Rhodes policies and imperial methods, that
our arbitration treaties and peace societies have been designed by
the imperialists as another effort to "throw a moral gloss over poli-
cies dubious if not actually immoral," claiming "benevolence" while
ruthlessly working for "extermination." Our small "ring" working
for alliance and peace meant to join the British in this Rhodes war
against Germany. Failing to bind Germany by the second type of
arbitration treaties, Sir Edward Grey nevertheless proposed to her
in 1914, while Russia was mobilizing, to submit her cause to arbi-
tration, so placing her under a moral cloud before the public even
if he could not bind her as he had wished.
Another evidence of laying plans far ahead to crush Germany
by the arbitration treaties is shown in the following quotation from
Figaro, 1911, published in Paris at the time of Taft's proposal for
arbitration treaties: "If other nations do not join the movement,
those who have pledged for arbitration should adopt the principle
of boycotting by inserting a clause in agreements that they should
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suspend all relations of commerce, transportation and postal service
with any country warring upon the signers."
This is not only against Germany, but also against us and all
other neutral nations. Will our imperialists and anglophiles ac-
quiesce, though they are so determined to maintain our rights to
sail on enemy ships that they would plunge us into war with Ger-
many for it, while at the same time they have not maintained rights
in Mexico, but recall us from the danger zone there where many
Americans have been killed just because they were Americans?
And after all of this, what must be thought of the latest of
peace societies that aims to secure peace by preparing us for war
and binding us by treaty to fight the nation that refuses to arbi-
trate? Preisdent Taft is its president—he who tried to bind us
to England, but not to -Germany, by a treaty of unlimited arbitration
for all time, just before Sir Edward Grey tried to precipitate war
in 1911 by insulting Germany, and who made arbitration treaties
that could be "worked" against Germany while her allied enemies
were arming. John Hays Hammond is its vice-president—he who
wrote the fake-telegram, appealing for assistance for women and
children who were not in danger, two months before it was guile-
fully sent out by Rhodes. This spring, when that "Society to
Ensure Peace by Preparing for War" was forming, a member of
the British Parliament lecturing in this country told us that an
attempt will be made in our Congress to frame new arbitration
treaties containing this clause. Is it likely that such treaties would
be used to do justice to all nations, or that John Hays Hammond
and the other tricksters who planned the arbitration schemes against
Germany in the past would manage by a fake-telegram or other
equally unscrupulous and more clever means to "throw a moral
gloss' over their unholy policies and make it seem that we ought
to go to war as they desire?
We shall not need to devote space to the other acts of Presi-
dent Taft nor to those of President Wilson, which are still fresh in
our aching memories. John Brisbane Walker in his Cooper Union
Speech has summed up the case well in his eight charges that Presi-
dent Wilson has not been for America first, but for England. Presi-
dent Wilson, like President Roosevelt, is doubtless prejudiced be-
cause he has read much English history from English sources.
He has been fighting for Duessa, the Empire and "big business,"
while our true Una is abandoned and strays without her natural
protector. May he see the wiles of the enchantress, and come back
to defend our ideal.
OUR SECRET ALLIANCE. 605
And what of our prospects if Mr. Hughes should be our next
president? It is clear that Roosevelt wanted to be president him-
self to carry out his plans, but both he and Taft have expressed
themselves as perfectly satisfied, since the long conference that
they held with the new candidate—the conference of Roosevelt and
Hughes was reported in the papers to have been three hours long,
and to have been held so secretly that even the waiters were not in
the room except when specially summoned. Why such secrecy? It
is in accord with too much secrecy that has gone before.
And why all of this preparedness? There is no person in this
country who would not want a preparedness for defense, and an
efficiency equal to German efficiency in that truly holy cause. Is
one not justified in hazarding a conjecture that we are preparing
to enter this war on the first likely pretext, and to be ready to take
part at the next turn of the Rhodes diplomatic screw, when Russia
will be the victim, along with Japan, who has risen into power since
1895 and is now allied with Russia for protection of the East?
When I say that that will be the next Rhodes war if all goes ac-
cording to schedule, I find that even people who have an unusual
knowledge of history do not know what I mean, for our busy lives
are too full of local afifairs to permit most of us to wander so far
afield as Africa in our reading. But a few months ago I talked
with a man who understood perfectly, an English gentleman who
had been in Oxford when Rhodes was there and knew him per-
sonally. This gentleman not only understood what the Rhodes
wars are, but proved his mastery of the Rhodes policies by saying,
"The next European war will be against Russia, and Germany will
fight as an ally of England," meaning the broken Germany that he
expects to come out of this war. Japan may well be more afraid
of us than we are of her if our Rhodes imperialists get their way.
To-day Russia and Japan are England's allies, but "perfidious Al-
bion" cannot be counted on to-morrow. When the last of the inde-
pendent nations have been broken, the map can be painted red—if
the people of the United States will consent.
If Great Britain is successful in this war, the fruits that she
garners will be exactly what Rhodes planned before 1895—Ger-
many's African colonies lying on the route from the Cape to Cairo,
and the breaking up of Germany as a world power, carrying with it
the destruction of her commerce abroad. Incidentals "to the good"
will be also the relative weakening of all other strong European
nations and a prolongation of their weakness through the long
period to come when they will be repaying the money they have
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borrowed from her, and the interest on it. The only other nation
that can gain much for the present is Russia, and her prospects for
the future are not good. Japan offers a new and different problem,
which this paper cannot attempt to discuss—but observers must
realize that the United States is expected to fight her soon. The
usual means by which England reduces the power of strong rivals
proportionally to her own is to incite them to fight each other
without herself striking a blow—and let it not be forgotten that
we also are her great rival, the greatest if we accept the judgment
of Napoleon when he signed the deed giving us Louisiana and of
Rhodes when "1920" was written. Our true eastern policy should
be an honest friendliness with China and Japan. Japan would
willingly grant, as China has done, such restrictions of immigration
as would safeguard our country, and would offer such privileges
of investment as China would gratefully give us since we returned
the surplus indemnity money. That act of common honesty has
been called exceedingly shrewd diplomacy on our part by the nations
that kept their surplus indemnity money—and so it doubtless is,
for it still holds true that honesty is the best policy. How much
has not England paid in money, men, and honor for her Rhodes,
whom she shielded when he stooped to dishonor for her gain? and
how much will she not pay for him in years to come? and what will
be our penalty for McKinley and John Hay? May it not be a war
with Japan ! She doubtless fears us because she has seen us from
the days of the Spanish war living by a secret alliance with England,
conquering Asiatic islands, helping to conquer y\frican republics,
policing the waters of the Pacific so that England may use her fleet
elsewhere, and adding boats upon boats to our navy, possibly to use
them against her and China. Shall we profit if we help to annex
China and Japan to the British empire? After we helped Great
Britain to annex the South African republics, she repaid us by
cleverly inserting a clause into her law regarding the importation
of machinery, that effectually excluded American industrial ma-
chines from Africa.
The hope of our poor world at this crisis seems to me to be in
the United States, and to lie in justice and friendliness to all na-
tions, and in making a notable success of the Republic. Since I
have understood the Rhodes policies and methods of the empire in
South Africa I have never been able to hear with patience the
frequently made assertions that a republic is the most corrupt form
of government and that an English king has less power than an
American president. The truth seems to be that in our republic
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our political "rings" can be broken and that we have held more in-
vestigations and arrived at more disagreeable truths than the em-
pires have. Could Canada conduct an investigation of the matters
of which I have spoken, though she pour out her blood and treasure
for the imperial cause? Who ever heard of any muck-raking in the
Russian empire? But it is the first principle of public health that
muck must not only be raked, but cleaned out. In the British
empire it is clear that matters are hushed up and that the highest
officials, including the king, constitute a "ring" that cannot be in-
vestigated. Even the farce of Jameson's trial would not have oc-
curred if that genius at world-politics, President Kriiger, had not
"waited for the turtle to show its head" before he struck at it, and
then sent Dr. Jameson to London for trial. Our political "rings" are
not hard to reach, and we can investigate if our people demand it.
Also, we have no official who "can do no wrong,'" or who, having
done wrong, is beyond impeachment and its penalty.
The greatest question before the American people just now
is this of alliances and foreign wars, and it is essential that all
parties should announce their platform of principles and purposes.
Every time that our presidents have moved toward open alliance
with England this nation has shown its disapproval so strongly
that the matter has been dropped, as I have shown. The astonish-
ing votes for Ford at the primaries this year spoke the same national
feeling
—
no foreign alliance, no zvar. In Ohio and Pennsylvania
the vote showed Roosevelt so far behind Ford that he could not
hope to carry an election ; the people have spoken against him as
they spoke against Taft, and many good judges on public matters
believe that he will never again emerge to win an election. That
vote is an argument that no man can carry an election here if it is
understood that he purposes foreign alliance and war. If President
Wilson has a chance of reelection it is because he has not yet com-
mitted us to war, much as he has done that is unjust and dangerous.
Many people still believe that he does not want war, as he says that
he does not. If Mr. Hughes purposes war, he has a chance of
election only because he has not announced himself. If these two
candidates purpose alliance or war after the nation has shown such
evidences that it does not want either alliance or war, they are
playing a game of bunco on our people in not announcing their
stand.
And among our people a profound distrust is rising. Only
to-day it was pointed out to me that German-Americans have not
been put on committees for the coming republican campaign, and
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the bitter forecast was made that this probably meant Hughes for
President, Roosevelt for Secretary of State, and both for war. I
am not German myself, I have not known many Germans ; bvit our
German-Americans seem to me to have been excellent citizens and
to have shown themselves wonderfully patient and devoted under
the bad treatment they and their mother country have been receiv-
ing. All attempts to prove them implicated in violence and treason
have proved fruitless—and only a few German citizens have done
far less than might have been reasonably expected in the way of
violence. Then why discriminate against our German-Americans,
if the Republican party means justice to German-Americans here
and to Germany abroad in case of Hughes's election?
The two policies from which we must choose—let us be clear
on this matter
—
are Rhodes imperialism and America finally again
subordinate to England in a map painted British red, or the United
States still the Great Republic and leading the zuorld by her example
to a friendliness that enriches all by commerce instead of hate that
impoverishes all, even the one zvho wins, by zuar. Rhodes and his
imperialists realized that if his policies were not successful before
1920, including the alliance with the United States, the United
States would become before 1920 the leading power of the world
—
as it has done. In this century just past, most strongly in the five
years just past—when China, Portugal, South Africa, and Ireland
have tried to become republics—this world tendency toward Amer-
ican ideals is proved. We may still conquer the world in peace by
our idealism, even England. Shall we disappoint the hopes of those
who struggle, by ourselves giving up what has been our most prec-
ious acquisition and their star of hope? And is this change to be
brought about by the secret machinations of a small group of our
own interested officials against the will of the people? In the
century that is past the British empire has waged almost perpetual
wars for conquest and power, with the result that her people are
the most poverty-stricken in western Europe, and according to her
own statistics have degenerated greatly physically. Our splendid
Canadian of Toronto, Mr. McDonald, tells as a peace argument
how the men of his clan in Scotland have dwindled in size as a
result of the wars of the empire—if we send out our young men
into imperial wars we shall likewise attain riches for a few munitions
makers and bankers now, but poverty and degeneration for the
nation at large, and final extinction as a republic for all.
Will our presidential candidates make clear their position on
foreign alliance and war? One profoundly wise suggestion on
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what we should have instead of war was reported in the New
York Times last spring, in an interview with Henry Ford, which
was that ive' should spend one-fourth as much money as a war
zvould cost us in trying to find out zvho gets up and disseminates this
agitation for ivar. If either President Wilson or Mr. Hughes will
announce a policy of friendship with all nations and entangling
alliances with none and will pledge himself to such an investigation
as Ford suggested, the votes cast for Ford in the primaries assure
him an overwhelming majority. .A Ford policy of peace and in-
vestigation, or a secret and Rhodes imperial policy of wars—which
shall it be?
God give us wisdom, and preserve our republic to be a friend
and guide to the nations. God speed the right
!
